Introduction
It goes further than her earlier work in relating these to the ethics and politics of development. It applies the approach directly and with insight to the predicament faced by women across the developing world, notably in two chapters on religion and care. This paper critically discusses Nussbaum's capabilities approach and compares it with the needs perspective developed in the earlier book by Len Doyal and myself, A Theory of Human Need (1991 -hereafter THN) . Though there are remarkable similarities between the two, both were written independently. When completing our book, published in 1991, we were unaware of Nussbaum's earliest article on this theme, Nature, function and capability: Aristotle on political distribution published in 1988, whereas her subsequent work was written in ignorance of our own contribution.
The publication of WHD provides an opportunity to compare and evaluate our theory of human need with her first fully developed perspective on human capabilities. However, this paper limits itself to the very specific issue of 'lists' and 'thresholds'. Unlike Sen, Nussbaum explicitly provides a comprehensive list of 'central human functional capabilities' which we can compare with our hierarchical model of human needs. Many other important issues related to her self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelian approach are ignored, and even within this remit much must be omitted.
Throughout I use Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach as the core text to illustrate Nussbaum's latest and most developed thinking on this topic. This work developed out of the 1998 Seeley lectures at the University of Cambridge and marks a clear advance on her earlier work on capabilities (Nussbaum 1992 (Nussbaum , 1993 (Nussbaum , 1995a (Nussbaum , 1995b . According to Gasper (2001) it reflects among other things her move to the Chair of Law and Ethics at Chicago and two research visits to India in 1997 and 1998 . This focus means that I ignore her important later work, such as
Frontiers of Justice (2006).
In the first part of this paper I identify the common project which underlies both Nussbaum's and our own work: to clarify and defend those universal human interests which alone can underpin an emancipatory and effective political programme for all women and men. The next two sections then set out in some detail our different taxonomies of capabilities and needs, and the thinking behind them. In the fourth section, the two approaches are compared in terms of their components, derivation and thresholds. On the basis of this three-way comparison, I conclude that our theory and operationalisation of human need is in certain respects theoretically more robust and empirically more realistic than Nussbaum's better-known approach.
Arguments for universals
Though Nussbaum uses different terms from us -'capabilities' versus 'needs' -we have much in common, notably the goal of developing a genuinely universal argument for human emancipation.
Though her book explicitly focuses on women's capabilities and options, and engages with the specific obstacles faced by most women and girls on the planet, this is at all times embedded in a theory which applies equally to men and boys. In particular, the two books argue the following three positions.
A 'fully universal' conception of capabilities/ needs
Taking for granted a world where many women lack support for fundamental functions of a human life, and where most women have fewer capabilities than men, her goal is to develop a 'universalist feminism' (WHD 7), based on 'the principle of each person as an end' (WHD 56). The philosophical underpinning for this universalism is the idea of human functionings, one respect among several where her work inter-relates with that of Amartya Sen. Sen defines a functioning as 'an achievement of a person: what she or he manages to do or to be ' (1985: 12) . Elsewhere he writes that functionings 'constitute a person's being'. Since some (not all) of these functionings are 'intrinsically valuable' they amount to states of well-being (Sen 1992: 4-7) . Capabilities then refer to the set of functionings that is feasible to that person -that she could choose.
However, Nussbaum, whose work in this area began independently of Sen, is more direct in addressing the issues of cross-cultural comparison and evaluation which this entails:
'An international feminism that is going to have any bite quickly gets involved in making normative recommendations that cross boundaries of culture, nation, religion, race and class. It will therefore need to find descriptive and normative concept adequate to that task.
I shall argue that certain universal norms of human capability should be central for political purposes in thinking about basic political principles that can provide the underpinning for a set of constitutional guarantees in all nations. I shall also argue that these norms are legitimately used in making comparisons across nations, asking how well they are doing relative to one another in promoting human quality of life .
'The account we search for should preserve liberties and opportunities for each and every person, taken one by one, respecting each of them as an end, rather than simply as the agent or supporter of the ends of others' (WHD 55). This 'focus on the individual person as such requires no particular metaphysical tradition … It arises naturally from the recognition that each person has just one life to live' (WHD 56) . To quote Soper (1993b 74) : 'What [Doyal and Gough's] work shows, they would argue, is that you can chart basic need satisfaction for "objective" welfare without either embracing relativism or operating at such a level of generality that the pertinence of the theory for specific problems concerning social policy is sacrificed'.
A critique of cultural relativism
Nussbaum develops an explicit critique of relativism iii by addressing three 'apparently respectable' arguments against universalism: the argument from culture, the argument from the good of diversity, and the argument from paternalism (what the biomedical model terms) TB, and then go on to the more difficult case of severe depression (63) (64) . Even in the case of depression, sufferers exhibit common symptoms across widely different cultures, such as hopelessness, breathlessness, lack of energy, and feelings of inadequacy. These common symptoms lead to the same kinds of disability across cultures, notwithstanding divergent and indeed incompatible ways of interpreting them.
3. An argument that the existence of needs/ capabilities entails strong moral claims to meet needs / develop capabilities.
Nussbaum's aim is 'to provide the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity requires' (WHD 5).
'In certain core areas of human functioning a necessary condition of justice for a public political arrangement is that it delivers to citizens a certain basic level of capability. If people are systematically falling below the threshold in any of these core areas, this should be seen as a situation both unjust and tragic' (WHD 71).
The language of rights permits us to draw strong normative conclusions from the fact of basic capabilities (WHD 100). In so doing, Nussbaum differs from Sen in regarding all capabilities as equally fundamental and rejecting Rawls' argument for the priority of liberty (WHD 12 However, we go further than Nussbaum in relating such rights to corresponding duties. Our argument in brief is as follows (see THN chapter 6 for the full argument):
1. The membership of any social group implies obligations or duties.
2. To ascribe duties to someone presupposes that they are in fact able to perform these duties.
3. The ascription of a duty thus logically entails that the bearer of the duty is entitled to the need satisfaction necessary to enable her or him to undertake that duty. It is inconsistent for a social group to lay responsibilities on some person without ensuring she has the wherewithal to discharge those responsibilities.
4. Where the social group is large, this entails similar obligations to strangers, whose needs we do not directly witness and can do nothing individually to satisfy. This will require support for agencies that guarantee to meet the needs of strangers. This is a plausible definition of a 'welfare state': public rights or entitlements to the means to human welfare in general and to minimum standards of well-being in particular, independent of rights based on property or income. Only the state can guarantee strong entitlements to people of this sort, though this does not require that it directly provides the satisfiers. It is at this stage, that we also argue for the equal prioritisation of rights to basic need satisfaction and reject Rawls' lexical ordering (THN 132-4).
iv It is clear that the philosophical and political agenda underlying our two approaches is to clarify and defend those universal human interests which underpin an emancipatory and effective political programme for all women and men. The differences that we now go on to outline should be seen as contrasting approaches to pursue a broadly common agenda. While the ten general categories are constant over time, the specific descriptions of them will change with historical circumstances; thus 'literacy is a concrete specification for the modern world of a more general capability'. Put more strongly, 'part of the idea of the list is its multiple realisability: its members can be more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and circumstances' (WHD 77). Furthermore, it 'is, emphatically, a list of separate components. We cannot satisfy the need for one of them by giving a larger amount of another one. All are of central importance and all are distinct in quality' (WHD 81).
Nussbaum first derived this list using a self-proclaimed 'neo-Aristotelian' approach.
Following the method in Nicomachean Ethics she identified 'spheres of human experience that figure in more or less any human life, and in which more or less any human being will have to make some choices rather than others' and to each of which there is a corresponding virtue (Nussbaum 1993: 245) . This generated a slightly varying list of 10-11 spheres of experience. The approach identified 'a core idea [my italics] of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others… A life that is really human is one that is shaped throughout by these human powers of practical reason and sociability' (WHD 72). This distinctive perspective generated a 'thick', richer conception of well-being compared with Sen's more neoKantian approach. 
Doyal and gough: a theory of human need
We develop a listing of needs with many points of convergence with the above. However it is constructed in a very different way. Our approach is hierarchical moving from universal goals, Step 1. Normative/ ethical reasoning: identifying universal goals 'Need' refers to a particular category of goals which are believed to be universalisable. The contrast with wants, goals which derive from an individual's particular preferences and cultural environment, is central to our argument. The universality of need rests upon the belief that if needs are not satisfied then serious harm of some objective kind will result. We define serious harm as fundamental disablement in the pursuit of one's vision of the good. It is not the same as subjective feelings like anxiety or unhappiness. Another way of describing such harm is as an impediment to successful social participation. Whatever the time, place and cultural group we grow up and live in, we act in it to some extent. We argue that we build a self-conception of our own capabilities through interacting with and learning from others. This is an essential feature of our human nature. It follows that participation in some form of life without serious arbitrary limitations is 'our most basic human interest' (THN 55).
Step 2. Basic needs: health and autonomy THN (52-54) develops a neo-Kantian argument in determining universal goals and basic needs:
'Although [Kant] was not directly concerned with the character of human need, he did articulate many concepts and arguments relevant to its theorisation. Kant showed that for individuals to act and to be responsible they must have both the physical and mental capacity to do so: at the very least a body which is alive and which is governed by all of the relevant causal processes and the mental competence to deliberate and to choose. Let us identify this latter capacity for choice with the existence of the most basic level of personal 'autonomy' … To be autonomous in this minimal sense is to have the ability to make
informed choices about what should be done and how to go about doing it. This entails being able to formulate aims, and beliefs about how to achieve them, along with the ability to evaluate the success of beliefs in the light of empirical evidence… It makes sense, We go on to argue that this aspect of autonomy should at its most basic level be understood negatively -with reference to the serious objective disablement which results when one or more of these characteristics is absent. Mental health is then the obverse of this -'practical rationality and responsibility' (THN 62). We address, though by no means systematically, some of the difficult issues of measurement this poses, citing evidence on the experiences and symptoms of mental illness across cultures. We conclude that, despite cultural variations in some features of, say, depression, these is a common core of disabling symptoms found in all cultures, including hopelessness, indecisiveness, a sense of futility and lack of energy (THN 180).
The second determinant of individual levels of autonomy is the level of cultural understanding a person has about herself, her culture and what is expected of her as an individual within it. This requires teachers and a form of teaching that is conducive to enquiry and further L learning. Third and last, autonomy of agency requires a range of opportunities to undertake socially significant activities. Again, there is a problem in determining minimum opportunity sets, given that even the most oppressed of people can and will exercise choices. Nevertheless, some minimum freedom of agency is an essential component of autonomy of agency in all cultures.
Lastly, we go on to recognise a higher-order level of autonomy, which we label critical autonomy. 'Critical autonomy entails the capacity to compare cultural rules, to reflect upon the rules of one's own culture, to work with others to change them and, in extremis, to move to another culture' (THN 187). This requires, beyond freedom of agency, some measure of political freedom.
This is not to deny that oppressed people exercise extremely high levels of creative and critical deliberation throughout their lives. It is for this reason that we favour defining critical autonomy as the possession of freedom of agency and political freedom (THN 68).
x
Step 3. Satisfiers and 'Intermediate Needs': the role of codified knowledge
While the basic individual needs for physical health and autonomy are universal, most goods and services required to satisfy these needs are culturally variable. For example, the needs for food and shelter apply to all peoples, but there is a large variety of cuisines and forms of dwelling which can meet any given specification of nutrition and protection from the elements. Following Max-Neef (1989:19) , we call all objects, activities and relationships which satisfy our basic needs 'satisfiers'.
Basic needs then are always universal but their satisfiers are often relative. xi However, if this were all we could say, it would have little purchase on the issues of rights, morality and development that Nussbaum and we wish to address. Can a conceptual bridge be built to link basic needs and specific satisfiers? We contend that the notion of 'universal satisfier characteristics' can fulfill that role.
This draws on Sen's (1985) analysis, following Lancaster, between commodities, characteristics and functionings. We define 'satisfier characteristics' as that set of all characteristics that have the property of contributing to the satisfaction of our basic needs in one or any cultural setting. We then distinguish within this set a subset of universal satisfier characteristics: those characteristics of satisfiers which apply to all cultures. Universal satisfier characteristics are thus those properties of goods, services, activities and relationships which enhance physical health and human autonomy in all cultures. For example, calories a day for a specified group of people constitutes a characteristic of (most) foodstuffs which has transcultural relevance. Similarly 'shelter from the elements' and 'protection from disease-carrying vectors' are two of the characteristics which all dwellings have in common (though to greatly varying degrees). Step 4. Societal preconditions Concerned lest our emphasis on autonomy suggests an individualised conception of human agency, we spend chapter 5 of our book expounding the social dimension of autonomy. Following Braybrooke (1987: 48-50) , we identify four societal preconditions -production, reproduction, cultural transmission and political authority -which have to be satisfied by all collectives if they are to survive and flourish over long periods of time ). Yet, though individual needs can never be satisfied independently of the social environment, we continue to insist that they must be conceptualised independently of any social environment. It is on this basis that we go to identify positive and negative freedoms as essential pre-requisites for the exercise of critical autonomy.
xii Aside from these societal preconditions, we may summarise our approach in two steps (cf instrumental, positive analysis of the prerequisites for various types and levels of capacity or functioning (Gasper 1996: 12) .
Comparing and evaluating the two approaches
I will compare our two approaches under the following headings: components, derivation, and levels/thresholds. In the process I begin to evaluate the two and offer some defence of our own approach.
L Components   Table 14 .1 brings these two lists together within the framework of our hierarchical model.
Insert Table 14 .1 here
In THN we caution that our list, like all taxonomies, is in one sense arbitrary (THN 159). The groups are 'verbal wrappings' or 'labels' designed to demarcate one collection of characteristics from another. Moreover, the word-labels used will be ambiguous -they will 'not contain or exhaust the meaning of the need identified'. Ambiguity can be reduced by increasing the numbers of characteristics or 'need categories'. Yet the larger the set, the greater the problems in comprehending the totality of human needs. We believe that this dilemma is encountered by
Nussbaum too, and indeed by anyone engaged in identifying components of well-being. The two lists must be compared bearing this in mind.
The table shows that there is considerable overlap between the two lists, notwithstanding differences in 'labels'. This overlap is to be expected and is a notable finding of other comparisons of components of well-being using a wider range of lists. xiii Moreover, it is interesting that of the three CHFCs that Nussbaum identifies as central, affiliation is similar to our central goal of participation, whereas bodily integrity and practical reason are closely related to our two basic needs of health and autonomy. This is an encouraging indication of the close parallels between our two projects. Yet, Nussbaum does not theoretically privilege these three components, as we do.
Another difference is that Nussbaum's CHFCs often include within them their societal preconditions. For example, after the component Affiliation A is introduced, there follows in parentheses: 'Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech' (WHD 79). Is it appropriate to include welfare and political rights of this sort within a list of human capabilities? xiv We believe that our strict distinction between, in a different language, human needs and the societal preconditions for their realization is more helpful. The former are attributes of individuals, the latter of collectivities. This builds on our distinction between basic autonomy or agency and critical autonomy, the latter served by political rights and freedoms. The intermingling of these within Nussbaum's list reflects the normative political conception and derivation of basic capabilities, at least since the early 1990s.
There are other differences. On the one hand, there are CHFCs which do not appear in our matrix of needs: certain aspects of Nussbaum's 'affiliation' do not appear to be covered by our universal goal of minimally disabled participation in one's social form of life. Similarly, 'play' and 'the ability to live in a fruitful relationship with animals and the world of nature' are absent. Nussbaum comments frankly on the present lack of consensus the last achieved in her project (WHD 157). In which case, why include it? It is incredible to consider that this component ranks on a par with bodily integrity or practical reason.
xv On the other hand, using the concept of universal satisfier characteristics we can identify more instrumental need components which are also universal but which do not figure in Nussbaum's list: for example, the intermediate needs for a non-hazardous environment and for appropriate health care. Our second-order list enables us to get closer to the real basic unmet needs confronting poor peoples across the globe. This fascinating chapter deserves more attention than we can offer here, but some comments are in order to illustrate how she conceives of reconciling wants and needs.
Nussbaum argues against two extreme positions, subjective welfarism and Platonism, and develops her thinking on the general Aristotelian concept of 'desire'. Contrasting the concepts of desire and preference, she asks what is the contribution of desire in the process of reaching such a 'reflective equilibrium' (WHD 151)? Her answer is that desire plays two roles: epistemic and political.
First, 'when people are respected as equals, and free from intimidation, and able to learn about the world, and secure against desperate want, their judgments about the core of a political conception are likely to be more reliable than judgments formed under the pressure of ignorance and fear and desperate need' (WHD 152). Second, desire plays an ancillary role in justifying and buttressing the political support necessary for a reflective equilibrium to be sustained. She claims that once people learn new capabilities, they don't want to go back. Even when women choose to return to traditional lives, such as a return to veiling, this is almost always 'a change in their mode of functioning, not in their level of political capability as citizens' (WHD 153). In other words they rarely insist, once experiencing the choice, that all women should be forced to veil. Nussbaum suggests that the epistemological and political roles of desire apply more strongly in subsequent generations.
Thus desires, in contrast to preferences, are not totally adaptive, for two reasons. On the one hand, 'the human personality has a structure that is at least to some extent independent of culture' (WHD 155) -a nod towards some universal conception of human capacities. On the other hand, 'by promoting education, equal respect, the integrity of the person, and so forth, we are also indirectly shaping desires' (WHD 161). Thus desire informed by (rarely achieved) conciousnessraising can play a subsidiary and confirmatory role in political justification. This suggests that there exists a potential bridge between the normative and the consensual stages in the shaping of an agreed list of human capabilities, though this must always be subsidiary to independent normative argument.
xviii Of course, professional doomsters like John Gray decry as utopian any attempt to achieve consensus and coordinated action around eradicating poverty, let alone around broader emancipation. 'The combination of rising human numbers, dwindling natural resources and spreading weapons of mass destruction is more likely to unleash wars of unprecedented savagery. If we can bring ourselves to look clearly at this prospect, we will lay aside utopian fantasies of global co-operation. We will see our task as staving off disaster from day to day ' (Gray, New Statesman 24.6.2002: 29) . This benighted vision is unconvincing as well as morally abhorrent, but it should caution against the over-optimistic alternative that wants and needs can be easily reconciled.
xix More importantly, Nussbaum has not in practice utilised the method she advocates. She has made some revisions to her earlier approach in response to discussions in India, the work of Martha Chen (1986) and other writers. However, this does not amount to systematically confronting her conception of the good with the values and experiences of the poor.
xx Our goal in developing a different, hierarchical approach was similar to Nussbaum's: to recognize cultural variety but to avoid subordinating the identification of needs to it. Our approach was, as we have seen, to develop a two-stage procedure. The first stage uses neo-Kantian arguments to develop a thin theory of human need. When focusing on health and autonomy of agency it is explicitly designed to fit all human societies. It deliberately seeks, so to speak, the lowest common denominator of universalisable preconditions for human action and social participation. In this way, we would claim, the potential for cross-cultural consensus is heightened. At the second stage, we appeal to collective knowledge, from both the natural and the social sciences, to identify the prerequisites for healthy and autonomous persons across different cultures (cf the remarks in the first section above concerning cross-cultural agreement on health). Against much post-modern scepticism we retain a belief in the potential of the scientific community to approximate an (evermoving) consensus on the pre -requisites for human flourishing.
Does not our approach risk the accusation of being paternalist? We believe not because we recognise the role of wide participation and experiential knowledge in understanding needs and need satisfiers. Drawing on Habermas' theorisation of communicative competence and the 'ideal speech situation', we stress that common rules of debate are required. xxi 'Insofar as participants in such debates conform to the above standards, Habermas contends that the most rational solutions … will be those which achieve the widest consensus' (THN 123). In the real world of dominant systems and interests, this entails at the least that 'the codified knowledge of professional must confront the rationalised life-world -the 'experientially-grounded knowledge' -which ordinary citizens develop through such self-reflection' (THN 125). Notwithstanding her rejection of Habermas'
proceduralism. there are some intriguing parallels with Nussbaum here; for example, the idea of rationality as consensus and the assumption of the goodness of ordinary people.
However, what is underplayed in our approach is Sen's valuable distinction between functionings and capabilities. Nussbaum embraces this, as when she writes: 'Where adult citizens are concerned, capability not functioning is the appropriate political goal' (WHD 87). This permits universal goals to be identified yet individuals' rights not to pursue them to be given due weight.
Fasting is not the same as starving; nor is celibacy the same as enforced sexual abstinence. This enables her to argue for both civil/political and social /economic rights. (By contrast, children may require enforced protection of and stimulation of their capabilities, for example through compulsory education). The functioning -capability distinction would help us to diminish lingering charges of paternalism (see Gough 2000, ch.1).
Levels and thresholds
A third point of comparison between our two approaches concerns the scope of the universalisable interests, which underlie our list of CHFCs/needs. Both Nussbaum and we endorse a broad view of human flourishing and wish to focus on minimal standards. Thus, on the one hand, Nussbaum continually speaks of 'a fully human life', of 'a life truly worthy of a human being'. In a similar vein we speak of 'human liberation', 'human flourishing', 'critical autonomy' as a basic need, and the right to 'optimal fulfilment' of basic needs. On the other hand, Nussbaum identifies a lower threshold level of capability, a basic social minimum which should be secured for all citizens (WHD 73, 75) . Similarly, we focus much of our attention on a lower standard: on avoidance of serious harm and on minimally disabled uncritical participation in one's form of life. xxii Thus both works have a dual agenda:
Nussbaum Doyal and Gough
Minimal standard Basic social minimum Avoidance of serious harm Broad human flourishing Fully human life Human liberation; optimal need fulfillment Seizing on this, Gasper (1996) has criticised our own work for both 'over-reach' and 'parsimony'.
'Over-reach' because the original derivation of basic needs in terms of harm-avoidance is then used to do too much work. The issues raised by critical autonomy are wide-ranging and deserve different and stronger forms of defence. Similarly, claiming optimal fulfilment of health care needs raises severe problems of a moral, not just a resource allocation kind, in an age where medicine can keep elderly people alive at vast cost. 'Parsimony', because our single-minded focus on health and autonomy excludes all aspects of life, like sex and religion, which are not universally necessary for effective participation. This echoes Soper's (1993a: 119) description of our 'somewhat puritanical and limited' list of basic and intermediate needs.
Gasper concludes: 'Doyal and Gough (are) drawn towards a broader conception of needs than seems implied by a criterion of avoiding serious harm. They formalize this by the extension to include critical autonomy, and their theory then has two versions, narrower and broader… We should accept that there are various criteria possible in needs discourse, each of which may be appropriate for different purposes. For pursuing a consensual priority for minimum requirements for decency, a narrower picture of needs is more appropriate than when trying to … prescribe for "human flourishing" or "the good life"… Both these major policy roles of needs analysis will be weakened by not clearly distinguishing between them' (Gasper 1996: 31-32 ).
This criticism is well taken. Towards the end of a long paper I merely offer two assertions and a comment in reply. First, the same verdict would seem to apply a fortiori to Nussbaum's conceptualisation of central human functional capabilities. Second, I believe that our distinction between autonomy of agency and critical autonomy provides a more rigorous foundation for our two-fold approach than Gasper claims. Turning to the related and final issue of thresholds, I would claim that we go further than Nussbaum. While she promises to address this question, she delivers little, mainly because her politically liberal approach would leave the setting of minimum thresholds to national or local decision-making procedures. Our approach to the question of standards and thresholds (THN 159-64) is again hierarchical, but begins conceptually at Gasper's highest level of human flourishing.
At the stage of basic needs, we endorse neither absolute minimum, nor culturally relevant standards, but an optimum standard. In line with the two levels of autonomy we identify two such levels: a participation optimum and a still higher, critical optimum. The latter comprises those levels of health and cognitive, emotional and social capacities which permit critical participation in one's chosen form of life. In practice, however, we endorse as a practical measure of this 'the most recent standards achieved by the social grouping with the highest overall standards of basic needsatisfaction'. We concluded that in the late-1980s, the best performing nation was Sweden. This also suggested a 'constrained optimum' standard for poorer countries: the highest achieved by countries at lower levels of development. We suggested these standard-setters were then Costa Rica for middle-income countries and Sri Lanka for poor nations. This could provide an empirical measure for assessing, for example, shortfalls in women's capabilities in the developing world, but it hardly constitutes the independently-derived normative threshold with which we began.
Considering intermediate needs, we argue for a minimum optimorum or minopt threshold. This is the minimum quantity of any given intermediate need-satisfaction required to produce the optimum level of basic need-satisfaction. The underlying assumption here is that the relationship is asymptotic: additional increments of a satisfier characteristic generating decreasing increments of basic need satisfaction until at the minopt point no additional benefit is derived.
However, Soper and Wetherly criticise our basic need standard on related grounds. Soper contends that this standard may actually be too high, in that the extravagance of Swedish energy use and socio-economic institutions is not generalisable to all other peoples in the world or to future generations. Insofar as this is true, it is accommodated within our definition of constrained optimum. But this raises a difficult issue. We have narrowed our focus from a concern with the universal requirements for social participation to whatever is universalisable across time and place in practice (Soper, 1993a: 78) . This raises more issues than can be dealt with here, but at the end of the day 'ought' must imply 'can'. If, due to past industrialism, population growth, environmental degradation and climate change we can achieve less than optimal generalisable satisfaction of basic needs, then so be it. We will be forever living in a world of constraint. Wetherly goes on to claim that this reintroduces relativism. The constrained optimum standard remains 'historically -and so socially, culturally -relative' (Wetherly, 1996: 58) . But the 'and so' does not follow. The concept of human need we develop is historically open to the continual improvements in understanding that have characterised human progress. But at any one time, there is a body of best knowledge to which international appeal can be made. Put starkly, our theory is relative in time but absolute in space.
Conclusions
This paper has concentrated on one aspect of Martha Nussbaum's recent book -the derivation and identification of 'central human functional capabilities' -itself just one small part of her total oeuvre.
My purpose has been to compare her approach with that developed by Len Doyal and myself in our claims that her latest account expresses an overlapping consensus of people from differing cultures, but there is little evidence that this has in fact happened, or that, if it did, the result would be the same. The potential of informed desire to bridge the gulf between, in our language, wants and needs is unproven. Paradoxically, I believe that little of this harms her central argument, as expressed for example in the powerful and insightful chapters on religion and love, care and dignity. However, a stronger conceptual foundation for her list would give added strength to the thrust of her book.
On the other hand, the Doyal-Gough theory provides a more parsimonious and logical derivation of a thick conception of human flourishing and an equally detailed list of basic and intermediate needs. Beginning with a common human interest -to participate in one's social form of life -we derive two basic human needs. We then call on codified and experiential knowledges to flesh out the universal pre-requisites for meeting basic needs at optimum and lower levels. This permits need satisfiers to be identified in a dynamic yet objective way. However, the exact way that codified and experiential knowledges are to be reconciled in our approach remains to be tackledespecially in a closely bound world of startling inequality and persistent cultural conflicts. I look forward to further debate on these issues.
Nussbaum's thick approach to human capabilities embraces a wide range of human activities and extols a broad vision of human flourishing, but its foundations are shaky and its potential for securing cross-cultural consensus is unproven and probably weak. Sen's thin theory of capabilities has greater potential for identifying priority capacities and has a proven record in underpinning an international consensus on human development, but it provides little systematic or comprehensive guidance on components of human functioning or well-being. Our theory of human need, we would claim, combines the merits of both. By expounding a thin derivation, and by carefully distinguishing autonomy of agency from critical autonomy, it recognises cultural differences within a universalist framework, but by positing universal satisfier characteristics and recognising our collective understanding of these it provides a richer framework for conceiving, measuring and -conceivablyimproving human well-being. ii She notes that of the major world religions only Buddhism seriously challenges this sort of emphasis on the individual.
iii This is one of the contrasts she draws between her work and that of Amartya Sen.
iv However, we go one step beyond the traditional confines of social policy. This commitment to meet the needs of strangers and to support the necessary welfare structures cannot stop at the borders of any particular state. The idea of universal human needs leads remorselessly to the global guarantee of their satisfaction. It lends powerful support to contemporary ideas of cosmopolitanism, which sees the entire world as a potential political community -however difficult are the obstacles and however utopian this sounds to our ears today. viii However it must be stressed that this has nothing in common with Maslow's hierarchical theory of needs as motivations (see THN ch.3).
ix The term need has been used by some to denote the commodity pre-requisites for a full life (see Sen 1985: 513) , but that is not the way we use it. It pertains to a space independent of commodities and utilities, and is thus comparable to Sen and Nussbaum's couplet of functionings and capabilities. That is why I sometimes refer in what follows to 'needs/ capabilities'.
x Contra Dworkin (1988:20) who distinguishes (second-order) autonomy as the capacity of persons to reflect on their first-order preferences, desires and wishes. For us this is a component of autonomy of agency everywhere, not just in political democracies.
xi Following Sen's similar point in his analysis of poverty: 'Poverty is an absolute notion in the space of capabilities but very often it will take a relative form in the space of commodities or characteristics ' [1983, p.161] . Like Nussbaum, we stress that needs are plural and non-additive.
'One domain of intermediate need-satisfaction cannot be traded off against another' (THN 166).
However we do recognize some limited areas where universal satisfiers are substitutes for one another. For example, a colder environment or heavy labour will increase the food requirements of humans.
xii The procedural and material preconditions for individual need satisfaction are discussed at length in Gough 2000, chapter 2. They are not pursued here.
xiii For comparisons of these and other lists see Saith (2001) , Clark (2002) and Alkire (2002 xvi Compare Clark's survey of a township and a village in South Africa, enquiring of poor people's own conceptions of their well being and capabilities (Clark 2003: 15-16 ).
xvii The problem of the circularity of preferences and preference evaluation was one of the starting points of our work xxii Much of the detailed argument in our respective books concerns this second, lower level.
xxiii But see Soper 1993a and 1993b for critical comments on this distinction.
